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On the morning of July 18, 1989, actress Rebecca Schaeffer
answered the door of her Los Angeles apartment and was shot to
death by a man she did not know. She was twenty-one years old. The
gunman, an obsessive fan of Schaeffer, had obtained the actress's
address from a private investigator, who in turn had paid the
California Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") five dollars for
it. The DMV's policy was to provide the address of any registered
motorist to any California resident who asked for it, as long as the
person making the request had either the motorist's license plate
number or driver's license number, and could pay the five dollar fee.'
Five years later, Congress responded to this and other abuses of
motor vehicle records by passing into law the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act2 (hereinafter "DPPA" or "Act"). The Act prohibits
state departments of motor vehicles and their agents from disclosing
personal information obtained from motor vehicle records, except
* J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the Law, May 2000. I would like to thank
Professors Calvin Massey and Ash Bhagwat for guiding my research in a productive
direction. Thanks are also due to my wife Lisa, who has involuntarily become an expert
on constitutional federalism. Without her continuing support, this Note would not be
possible.
1. See Local Private Eye Led Suspect to Actress, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1989, at Al.
2. Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXX, 108 Stat.
2099 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725).
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under specified conditions. Specifically, States must disclose personal
motor vehicle information in connection with safety, theft, and
emissions programs, as well as for dealer recalls and advisories.3
States may disclose information for use by government agencies,
including courts and law enforcement; by businesses to verify
information submitted to them; in connection with litigation,
including the service of process; in connection with research activities,
including the production of statistical reports; by insurance companies
to investigate claims; and for several other enumerated permissible
uses.4 Beyond these enumerated permissible uses, however, States
must not make personal motor vehicle information available 5 A
State that refuses to comply is subject to a federal civil penalty of up
to $5,000 per day.6
Since the DPPA was enacted, four States have filed lawsuits
challenging the constitutionality of the Act.7 The States argue that
the Act requires them to enact regulations in order to enforce a
federal policy, in contravention of the Tenth Amendment.8 In
advancing this argument, the States rely heavily on two recent
Supreme Court opinions. In New York v. United States,9 the Court
held unconstitutional a provision of a federal statute requiring States
to enact specific legislation to resolve a growing nationwide toxic
waste problem.10 The Court relied on what has come to be known as
the "anti-commandeering" principle, under which the federal
government may not conscript a State's lawmaking authority to serve
its own legislative agenda." And in Printz v. United States,12 the
Court extended this principle to prohibit federal commandeering of a
State's executive officers, striking down a provision of the Brady
Handgun Law which required state law enforcement officers to
conduct background checks of prospective gun purchasers. 13 The
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b).
4. See id. § 2721(b)(l)-(14).
5. See id. § 2721(a).
6. See id. § 2723(b).
7. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (Alabama); Travis v. Reno, 163
F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998) (Wisconsin); Oklahoma ex rel Oklahoma Dept. of Pub. Safety v.
United States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998) (Oklahoma); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453
(4th Cir. 1998) (South Carolina), cerL granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (U.S. May 17,1999) (No. 98-
1464).
8. The Tenth Amendment reads, "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
9. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
10. See id. at 188.
11. See id. at 161.
12. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
13. See id. at 935.
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States contesting the Driver's Privacy Protection Act argue that, like
the statutes at issue in New York and Printz, the Act requires the
States to "enact or administer a federal regulatory program."'14
Each of the four suits has now reached its respective circuit court
of appeals, and these courts are evenly divided on the
constitutionality of the DPPA.15 To resolve the conflict among the
circuits, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in one of the
cases.16 Oral argument is set for November 10, 1999, and a decision is
expected in the spring. 17 This Note will argue that the DPPA is a
constitutionally valid legislative enactment under the anti-
commandeering principle articulated by the Court in New York and
Printz. In addition, this Note will question the constitutional
legitimacy of the anti-commandeering principle. Part I reviews recent
Supreme Court cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment. Part II
applies these precedents to the DPPA, examining the cases litigated
before the lower courts and concluding that the Act does not
implicate the anti-commandeering principle. Part Ill concludes that
the anti-commandeering principle enjoys little support in
constitutional text, history, precedent, or policy, and is therefore
highly suspect.
I. A Brief History of Federalism
A. Overview
Federalism refers to the set of issues that define the balance of
power between the national government and the individual state
governments in the United States. Specifically, federalism asks to
what extent the Constitution permits the national government to
exercise powers that before 1787 were held exclusively by the States.18
This Note examines one aspect of federalism: To what extent may
Congress pass laws which potentially infringe on the sovereignty of
the States?' 9  Those who advocate federalism-based limits on
14. Id. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
15. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (DPPA is unconstitutional);
Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998) (DPPA is constitutional); Oklahoma ex reL
Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998) (DPPA is
constitutional); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998) (DPPA is unconstitutional),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (U.S. May 17,1999) (No. 98-1464).
16. See Condon, 119 S. Ct. at 1753.
17. See Michael J. Collins, Is the Driver's Privacy Protection Act a Valid Exercise of
Congressional Power?, PREVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES, Oct. 20,
1999, available in WESTLAW, at 1999-2000 PREVIEW 72.
18. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 87,
88 (13th ed. 1997).
19. A separate aspect of federalism which has received much attention of late is the
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
congressional power argue that when Congress enacts laws which
undermine the continuing vitality of the States as a part of our federal
system, federal courts must intervene and hold these laws
unconstitutional. For example, in Coyle v. Smith,20 the Supreme
Court ruled that Congress may not condition a State's entry into the
union upon acceptance of Congress's chosen location for the state
capital. Such an imposition would unduly interfere with powers that
"essentially and peculiarly" belong to the States.21
Over the past sixty-five years, the debate over federalism has
taken on increasing importance as two national values have come into
conflict. The Framers of the Constitution envisioned a limited role
for the federal government:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal
Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in
the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.... The
powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects,
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties
and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement,
and prosperity of the State.22
Many of the States relied on this vision, and on an explicit promise to
create a Bill of Rights reserving powers to the States, when they
ratified the Constitution.23
On the other hand, one of the principal reasons the Framers
drafted the Constitution was to permit the national government to
regulate interstate commerce 2 4 As the U.S. economy has grown from
a local, agrarian economy into a truly national economy, the power to
regulate interstate commerce has grown in proportion.25 Today, few
federal regulatory activities are beyond the reach of the Commerce
Clause.26 And once Congress has constitutional authority to enact a
extent to which courts may adjudicate the rights of States without the States' consent. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars
such adjudication of individual lawsuits in federal court); Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240
(1999) (same in state court). These decisions, however, do not foreclose the enforcement
of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act because they permit the United States to bring suit
against a State without the State's consent. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
20. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
21. Id at 565.
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
23. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568-72 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
24. The Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce...
among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25. The Court has interpreted this power to extend to purely intrastate activities, as
long as they substantially affect interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 559 (1995).
26. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 584 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's
assessment that virtually every activity falls within the commerce power may need to be
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law, the States are bound by the Supremacy Clause27 to follow it.
Accordingly, absent some affirmative restraints on congressional
authority to regulate, expanding federal power under the Commerce
Clause threatens to overwhelm the Framers' intention that substantial
lawmaking authority be reserved for the States.
Before 1976, the Supreme Court invalidated congressional
enactments on federalism grounds only rarely, in cases of egregious
violations.28 As a leading commentator states, "[T]he conventional
wisdom was that federalism in general-and the rights of states in
particular--provided no judicially enforceable limits on congressional
power."29
B. National League of Cities and Garcia
In National League of Cities v. Usery,30 the Court for the first
time imposed a specific, affirmative limitation on Congress's exercise
of the commerce power. The case concerned Congress's 1974
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act.31  The 1974
amendments extended the Act's minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions to virtually all employees of the States and their political
subdivisions.32 The Court held the amendments unconstitutional to
the extent they "directly displace[d] the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. '33
It rested its holding on the belief that the congressional enactments in
issue "would impair the States' ability to function effectively in a
federal system." 34
In the wake of this decision, the federal district courts and circuit
courts of appeals were left to sort out what exactly constitutes a
"traditional governmental function." The results were inconsistent.3 5
The Supreme Court itself had difficulty articulating any plausible
distinction between "traditional" and "non-traditional" governmental
modified slightly in light of Lopez.
27. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
28. See, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (holding that Congress may not tell a
State where it must locate its capital).
29. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 378 (2d ed. 1988).
30. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
31. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,29 U.S.C. § 201, amended by Pub. L. No. 93-
209,88 Stat. 55 (1974).
32. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 836.
33. Id at 852.
34. Id (citation and internal quotation omitted).
35. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1985)
(collecting cases from lower courts).
functions.36 In response to this difficulty, and less than nine years
after it had first announced substantive affirmative limits on
congressional authority to encroach on areas of traditional state
concern, the Court abandoned the "traditional/non-traditional"
distinction.
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,37 the
Court overruled National League of Cities, reinstating Congress's
extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees
generally. It specifically disavowed any test of constitutionality "that
turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental
function is 'integral' or 'traditional."' 38  However, it declined to
replace the fallen standard with any other specific, affirmative limit
on Congress's power to regulate States under the Commerce Clause.
Instead, the Court concluded that the fact of their representation in
Congress would serve as the States' protection from congressional
overreaching. As the majority stated, "[T]he principal and basic limit
on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional
action--the built-in restraints that our system provides through State
participation in federal governmental action. '3 9 The Court did,
however, leave open the possibility that the Constitution might
impose some affirmative limits on the commerce power.40
C. New York and Printz
Seven years later, the Court imposed one such affirmative
limitation in New York v. United States.4' In response to a severe
shortage of disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste, Congress
passed into law in 1985 a series of three incentives designed to spur
the States to action.42 The third incentive required each State on
January 1, 1996, to take possession of all such waste generated within
its borders, if the State had not passed a law providing for its disposal
by that date.43
36. See id. at 539-40.
37. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
38. Id at 546-47.
39. kla at 556.
40. See id.
41. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
42. See icL at 150-51. In 1979, after shutdowns of several facilities, only one disposal
site (in South Carolina) remained operational in the entire United States. At the urging of
the National Governors Association ("NGA"), Congress passed a law in 1980 encouraging
the States to act, but imposing no penalties for States that failed to do so. By 1985 few
States had taken steps to provide for the disposal of their low-level radioactive waste.
That year, again at the urging of the NGA, Congress passed the incentives into law. See
id.
43. See i. at 153-54.
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In striking down this third incentive under the Tenth
Amendment, the Court articulated what has come to be known as the
"anti-commandeering" principle.44  Simply stated, this principle
prohibits the federal government from "commandeering" a state
government by directly requiring it to enact a federally mandated
program.45 If Congress wishes to regulate the activities of individuals,
it must enact the legislation itself, rather than demanding that the
States do so. In the words of Justice O'Connor, "Where a federal
interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do
so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents.
'46
The third incentive failed this constitutional test. Congress could not
direct a State to take possession of the waste generated within its
borders,47 nor could it require the State to pass a law providing for the
disposal of such waste. Each of these alternatives involved the
proscribed commandeering of the State's legislative function by the
federal government. And forcing a State to choose between two
unconstitutional alternatives was itself unconstitutional. 48
The Court reaffirmed and extended the anti-commandeering
principle in Printz v. United States.49 At issue was an interim
provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act50 requiring
the chief local law enforcement officer (generally the sheriff) of a
prospective gun purchaser's county of residence to reasonably
investigate that individual's background so as to verify that such a
purchase would not violate the law.5' The Court struck down the
provision under the Tenth Amendment. Writing for a 5-4 majority,52
Justice Scalia held: "The Federal Government may [not] command
the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. '53 Thus, just as
New York prohibits federal commandeering of a State's legislative
processes, Printz prohibits federal commandeering of its executive
officials as well.
The Supreme Court has issued no further opinions addressing
the issue of federal commandeering of state governmental functions.
44. See id. at 161-66, 177.
45. See id. at 161.
46. Id. at 178.
47. Ordering a State to accept such liabilities would be equivalent to ordering the
State to legislate direct subsidies to waste producers. See id. at 175.
48. See id. at 175-76.
49. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
50. Pub. L. No. 103-159,107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
51. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902.
52. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Thomas. See id. at 900.
53. Id. at 935.
Accordingly, the current state of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
stands as follows. Under Garcia, the States' principal protection from
congressional intrusion into matters of state sovereignty lies in the
political process, in the fact of their representation in the federal
government. By definition, courts lack the power to enforce such a
political limitation. However, under New York and Printz, the anti-
commandeering principle imposes a judicially enforceable,
procedural restraint upon Congress. While the federal government
has broad power under the Commerce Clause to directly regulate the
behavior of its citizens, it may not administer its regulatory program
by conscripting state legislatures or officers as its agents.
H. The Driver's Privacy Protection Act Does Not Violate the
Anti-Commandeering Principle
Part I summarized the leading Tenth Amendment cases decided
by the Supreme Court. This part applies those teachings to the
DPPA. I conclude that the Act is constitutional under current law54
Although it directly regulates the States, it does not do so in the
manner prohibited by the Tenth Amendment. I begin by examining
the lower federal court decisions interpreting the Act.
A. Two Circuits Uphold the DPPA
Both the Seventh and Tenth Circuits have held the DPPA
constitutional under existing Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. In
Travis v. Reno,55 the Seventh Circuit held that the Act "is within the
commerce power and compatible with constitutional principles of
federalism. '56 Wisconsin argued that the Act, like the statutes struck
down in New York and Printz, impermissibly commandeers the
State's governmental apparatus because it requires the State to adopt
new regulations in order to comply.57 The court rejected this
argument, distinguishing federal laws that conscript state
governments as agents from those like the DPPA that simply demand
54. Scholars have criticized the Printz decision on various grounds. See, eg., Evan H.
Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 Sup. Cr. REV. 199(arguing that the formalist approach adopted by the Printz majority rests ultimately on
unsupported ad-hoc judgments, rendering the Printz opinion unpersuasive). However,
Part II will proceed from the assumption that Printz and New York are the law and will
address only the question whether the DPPA is constitutional when considered in light of
these previous Court decisions. For an extended discussion of the constitutional validity
of the anti-commandeering principle developed by the Court in New York and Printz, see
infra Part III.
55. 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998).
56. lId at 1001-02.
57. See id. at 1003.
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compliance.58 Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook noted,
[F]ederal law pervasively regulates states as marketplace
participants; the anti-commandeering rule comes into play only
when the federal government calls on the states to use their
sovereign powers as regulators of their citizens. Because the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act affects states as owners of data,
rather than as sovereigns, it does not commandeer states in
violation of the Constitution. 59
Similarly, in Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Department of Public
Safety v. United States,6° the Tenth Circuit found that the DPPA does
not violate the anti-commandeering principle. The court noted that
the Act does not require States to legislate according to a federal
agenda, but instead directly regulates the behavior it wishes to
proscribe.61 Neither does the Act direct state officials to enforce it,
but instead provides its own federal enforcement mechanisms.62
"Unlike [the statutes at issue in] New York and Printz, the DPPA
does not affect any unique government function, such as the state
legislative process or state law enforcement activities." 63
Both the Seventh and Tenth Circuit opinions relied on South
Carolina v. Baker64 as controlling precedent.65 At issue in South
Carolina was a provision of a 1982 federal tax statute that removed
the federal tax exemption on interest earned on state and local bonds,
unless those bonds were issued in registered form. 6 By stipulation of
the parties, however, the Court treated the statute as if it simply
prohibited the States from issuing unregistered bonds.67
South Carolina argued that Congress may not require the States
to issue its bonds in a particular form, because such an action
"commandeers the state legislative and administrative process by
coercing States into enacting legislation authorizing bond registration
and into administering the registration scheme."68 The Court replied
that a law requiring such actions on the part of the State does not
constitute the type of commandeering that the Constitution
proscribes.69  Justice Brennan wrote: "Any federal regulation
demands compliance. That a State wishing to engage in certain
58. See iiL at 1004-05.
59. Id.
60. 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
61. See id. at 1272.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
65. See Travis, 163 F.3d at 1004; Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1270,1272.
66. 485 U.S. at 507-08.
67. See id. at 511.
68. Id. at 513.
69. See iL at 514.
activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to
comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a
commonplace that presents no constitutional defect. ' 70
B. Two Circuits Strike Down the DPPA
In contrast to the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits have found the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
unconstitutional. In Condon v. Reno,7 1 the Fourth Circuit held that
Congress, in passing the DPPA, exceeded its commerce power insofar
as that power is constrained by the Tenth Amendment. The court
conceded that the DPPA neither commandeers the State's legislative
process nor conscripts the State's officers,72 but nevertheless found
the Act invalid. It cited New York for the proposition that "Congress
may only subject state governments to generally applicable laws." 73
As opposed to "a law of general applicability that incidentally applies
to the States," the DPPA "for all intents and purposes, applies only to
the States," and is therefore unconstitutional.74
The Fourth Circuit's opinion misconceives New York. True, the
Court in New York drew a distinction between generally applicable
federal laws which apply incidentally to the States and federal laws
which improperly commandeer the States.75 But the Court never
suggested that federal laws which apply only to the States were per se
invalid, as the Fourth Circuit infers. New York established nothing
more than that Congress may not direct the States to enact specific
legislation. The New York Court struck down the act in question
because it "commandeer[ed] the legislative process of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program... an outcome that has never been understood to lie within
the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution." 76 As the
Fourth Circuit concedes, the DPPA does not similarly commandeer
the state legislatures. 77
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Pryor v. Reno78 merits more
serious attention. Here, too, the court calls attention to the
distinction between laws of general applicability and laws targeted
70. IdM at 514-15.
71. 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998).
72. See id. at 460.
73. Id. at 456 (internal quotation omitted; citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992)).
74. Id.
75. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1992). For a criticism of the
validity of this distinction, see infra text accompanying notes 127-34.
76. Id. at 176 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
77. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460.
78. 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999).
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exclusively at States.79 However, the court's focus is on the
administrative burdens the States must bear in obeying the provisions
of the DPPA.
The Eleventh Circuit begins its opinion by describing in minute
detail the circumstances under which the Act prohibits, permits, or
requires a State to release information contained in its motor vehicle
records.80 The extent of this detail then becomes the centerpiece of
the court's holding. Because the DPPA delineates the exact
circumstances under which States may release their data, the court
comprehends the Act to direct state officials to administer a federal
regulatory scheme:
[T]he DPPA does establish a detailed set of rules under which
Alabama's disclosure or refusal to disclose to third parties the
personal information in its motor vehicle records shal be done as
the federal establishment wishes it to be done....
... State officers are directed to administer and enforce these
rules.81
But the applicability of the anti-commandeering principle does
not hinge on the complexity of the federal law at issue or on the level
of burden the regulation imposes upon the States. A congressional
enactment either commandeers the State's governmental apparatus
or it does not. As Justice Scalia made clear in Printz, such
commandeering is per se invalid:
[W]here, as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct the
functioning of the state executive.., a "balancing" analysis is
inappropriate. It is the very principle of separate state sovereignty
that such a law offends, and no comparative assessment of the
various interests can overcome that fundamental defect.
82
The constitutional yardstick by which the DPPA is measured is not
the extent of the Act's burden on state officials, but whether that
burden constitutes the commandeering of the state executive which
Printz forbids.
C. The DPPA Demands States' Compliance, Not Their Administrative
Assistance
Printz thus makes clear that federal legislation may impose
burdens upon the States only if those burdens do not amount to
commandeering, that is, directing the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program. In this regard, a State's obligation to
follow federal law is not the type of administrative burden proscribed
79. See id at 1286-87.
80. See id. at 1282-84.
81. Ia at 1285-86.
82. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (footnote omitted).
by Printz. While the burdens the DPPA imposes are no doubt real,
they are the burdens of compliance, not the burdens of
administration. Every federal law that regulates the behavior of the
States imposes administrative burdens upon the state government,
including its officials and its agencies, in conforming the State's
activities to the standards set forth in the federal regulatory scheme.
If the DPPA is unconstitutional because it imposes these
administrative burdens, many other federal laws must be similarly
unconstitutional.8 3
The Supreme Court observed in South Carolina84 that federal
laws demand compliance. When those laws regulate the behavior of
States, States will be required to take administrative action to comply
with federal standards. 85 This observation applies with equal force to
the Driver's Privacy Protection Act as to the prohibition on
unregistered state and municipal bonds at issue in South Carolina.
Like the prohibition on unregistered bonds, the prohibition on the
release of motor vehicle records requires state action in compliance.
Also like the prohibition on unregistered bonds, the prohibition on
the release of motor vehicle records "presents no constitutional
defect. '86 There simply is no principled distinction between the
DPPA and the federal taxation statute at issue in South Carolina.
One may, however, legitimately question whether after Printz,
South Carolina is still good law.87 But while the South Carolina
decision predates the current Court, the reasoning behind the South
Carolina holding remains persuasive. If any federal law that requires
States to take administrative action in compliance is unconstitutional
because it commandeers state governments, then "any State could
immunize its activities from federal regulation by simply codifying the
83. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that if DPPA
unconstitutionally commandeers state government, so does the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which imposes recordkeeping and compensation requirements to which States must
adapt). See also Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (citing other
federal laws which mandate disclosure of certain motor vehicle information. If the DPPA
is struck down for commandeering, these federal statutes must also fall, for they also direct
state agencies to disclose information in certain circumstances.).
84. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
85. See id. at 514-15.
86. Id. at 515.
87. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia concurred only in the judgment in South
Carolina, and Justice O'Connor dissented. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision.
Moreover, Justice Brennan's pronouncements on the scope of congressional power have
not fared particularly well during this Court's tenure. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1988) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion), overruled by Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Brennan, J.),
limited by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,527-29 (1997).
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manner in which it engages in those activities." 88 Such a result is
incompatible with our constitutional design. While States retain a
substantial degree of sovereignty under the Constitution, they are not
co-equal sovereigns with the national government.89 Instead, federal
law is still "the supreme Law of the Land."9 Any extension of the
anti-commandeering principle which States could invoke to avoid
complying with federal law would seriously undermine the
Supremacy Clause, and therefore the Constitution.
Looking at the issue from a slightly different angle, Congress
must have some means of carrying into action its enumerated powers,
in this case the commerce power. No one disputes that the
Commerce Clause reaches the release of personal information to
national and multinational companies. No one disputes that, but for
the anti-commandeering principle, Congress has the authority to
regulate the release of such information, whether the regulated entity
be a State or a private company. If direct regulation of the States
constitutes improper commandeering, how then is Congress to
exercise its acknowledged power and prevent state departments of
motor vehicles from releasing personal information from their
databases just as it would prevent private entities from so doing?91
The Constitution cannot be interpreted in a way that renders an
enumerated Article I power a nullity.
Accordingly, the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 does
not commandeer the States in violation of the Tenth Amendment.
And besides the anti-commandeering principle, the States' only
protection from Congressional overreaching lies in the political
process itselfY2 Since the political process produced the DPPA, and
the Act does not commandeer the States, the Act must be
constitutional under current law as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
HI. Should There Be an Anti-Commandeering Principle?
Having concluded that the anti-commandeering principle does
not render the Driver's Privacy Protection Act unconstitutional, I
turn now to the question whether the anti-commandeering principle
is constitutionally valid.
88. South Carolina, 485 U.S. at 515.
89. See Caminker, supra note 54, at 206-07.
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
91. In contrast, Congress had a simple alternative to its conscription of the States'
chief law enforcement officers when it enacted the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act, at issue in Printz. Practical difficulties aside, Congress could have required federal
officials to conduct the background checks.
92. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,556 (1985).
A. Anti-Commandeering Enjoys Little Support in Constitutional Text,
History, or Precedent
Sound constitutional analysis must necessarily begin with the text
of the Constitution. That document contains no language that, either
explicitly or by inference, prohibits Congress from ordering the States
to pass legislation. While some might read such a limitation into the
Tenth Amendment, the Court frankly admits that the powers
"reserved" to the States under that amendment are merely those that
the Constitution has not seen fit to confer upon the federal
government. "[T]he Tenth Amendment 'states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered. ' ' 93
In Printz, the Court stated that a law that commandeers the
States is not "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the
commerce power because it is not a proper use of federal power. 94
This assertion, of course, begs the question: Why is commandeering
improper? Certainly nothing in the Constitution's text indicates that
it is.
The Court in New York relied heavily upon the historical
sequence of events that led to the ratification of the Constitution to
support its position that commandeering is unconstitutional.95 The
Court observed that, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress
generally lacked the power to govern the people directly.96 Instead,
federal power was exercised upon the States, which in turn exercised
power over the people according to the federal mandate. The
founders of the Constitution saw this mode of governmental action-
national power exercised through the intermediary authority of the
States-as a major defect of the national government under the
Articles27 Alexander Hamilton noted, "[W]e must extend the
authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens-the only proper
objects of government." 98
Ultimately, Hamilton and the federalists prevailed. The States
ratified the Constitution, ceding some direct lawmaking authority to
the national government. According to the Court, at the same time
the States granted to the national government this power to regulate
individuals directly, they simultaneously withdrew the power to
93. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (quoting United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100,124 (1941)).
94. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (quoting U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 8, cl. 18).
95. See New York, 505 U.S. at 163-66.
96. See id. at 163.
97. See id.
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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regulate individuals indirectly through the States.99 But the historical
evidence supporting the Court's view is marginal at best. The Court
relies on several quotations taken from the debates on the
Constitution'0° but neglects to mention Hamilton's clear statements to
the contrary in the Federalist Papers:
The [Constitution], by extending the authority of the federal head
to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the
government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each in the
execution of its laws .... Thus the legislatures, courts, and
magistrates, of the respective members will be incorporated into
the operations of the national government... and will be rendered
auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.' 0 '
An objective analysis reveals that the Constitution's history simply
does not support the anti-commandeering principle.
The Court has also cited precedent, implying that both Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc °2 and FERC v.
Mississippi'0 3 support its newfound constitutional principle.1 4 In both
cases, though, the Court upheld the statutes at issue against
constitutional attack. In Hodel, the Court barely discussed anti-
commandeering, dismissing in a single sentence the argument that the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977105 improperly
conscripted the state governments. °6 And in FERC (a case whose
facts are barely distinguishable from those of New York) the Court
99. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166 ("In providing for a stronger central government,
therefore, the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the
power to regulate individuals, not States.").
100. See i& at 165-66 (quoting Charles Pinckney, Rufus King, and Alexander Hamilton,
among others).
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 176-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (emphasis added). Even the quotation of Hamilton which the New York Court
chose to excerpt, see 505 U.S. at 163, provides ample room for debate whether the framers
understood the adoption of the new power to regulate directly to occur in place of, or in
addition to, the old power to regulate indirectly through the States. Hamilton said, "[W]e
must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens-the only proper
objects of government." THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). By emphasizing the word "extend," one can argue that the intention
was to add to the existing power. By emphasizing the word "only," one can argue to the
contrary that only the citizens were meant to be objects of federal legislation.
102. 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (holding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 constitutional).
103. 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (finding the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 to
be within the commerce power).
104. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161-62; Printz, 521 U.S. at 928-29.
105. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445.
106. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 ("Thus, there can be no suggestion that the Act
commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program.").
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upheld the federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978107
("PURPA"), which required state utility commissions to consider
federally formulated "suggestions" on ways to improve their rate
structures within two years of PURPA's enactment. The Court also
came very close to considering and rejecting the anti-commandeering
principle in a footnote.10 8
Thus, the textual, historical, and precedential support for the
anti-commandeering principle is thin at best. Under these
circumstances, one might expect the Court to take pains to explain
the policy justifications which warrant the principle's constitutional
status.
B. Three Policy Rationales for Anti-Commandeering
In fact, the Court has evinced little interest in, and at times has
demonstrated outright hostility to, the idea that it should justify anti-
commandeering on the basis of the principle's real-world
ramifications. In New York, the Court stated bluntly, "The benefits
of this federal structure have been extensively cataloged
elsewhere... but they need not concern us here.... The question is
not what power the Federal Government ought to have but what
powers in fact have been given by the people."' °9 This is an
unfortunate position for the Court to have taken. Given the scant
textual, historical, and precedential support for anti-commandeering,
the Court owes us a complete explanation as to just why it has chosen
to import this absolute'10  principle into our constitutional
jurisprudence.
Some discussion of the policies animating the anti-
commandeering principle does appear in the New York and Printz
opinions, although the Court never undertakes a considered
examination of the strength of those policies and the countervailing
arguments against them. A careful reading of these cases reveals
three distinct rationales asserted in defense of anti-commandeering:
the "accountability" rationale, the "power" rationale, and the
"money" rationale. I will examine each of these in turn, concluding
that none properly supports the Court's position.
1. Accountability
Under the accountability rationale, federal commandeering of
107. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117.
108. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 761 n.25.
109. New York, 505 U.S. at 157 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
110. "We... conclude categorically, as we concluded categorically in New York: 'The
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program."' Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
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state governments causes confusion regarding which government is
responsible for repugnant legislation. Where Congress legislates
directly, voters unhappy with the legislation can express themselves at
the ballot box. Federal officials thus bear the brunt of their own
unpopular acts. On the other hand, where Congress requires the
States to legislate, voters may throw out the state legislators who
directly passed the unpopular program while the federal officials who
devised the legislation escape unharmed."'
I agree that there is some value to knowing which of the two
governments is responsible for a particular piece of legislation.
However, the accountability rationale suffers two important flaws.
First, other forms of legislation, permissible under the anti-
commandeering principle, cause confusion over which government is
responsible to the same extent as federal legislation that
commandeers the States. For example, federal exercises of the
spending power that condition a State's receipt of federal funds upon
the State's enactment of a particular law, are equally susceptible to
the accountability argument. Second, state officials forced to enact a
federal program which they believe will be unpopular will not be shy
about pointing out to voters that "Washington" made them do it.112
Most people knew that the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit was the
work of the federal government, even though state highway patrol
officers wrote out the speeding tickets." 3
2. Power
Under the power rationale, the structure of the Constitution
divides regulatory power between state and federal governments.
This division of power between the two governments secures the
liberty of the people so governed: "'Just as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government
serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from
either front.' 1 4 Thus, the anti-commandeering principle protects the
people's freedom from governmental encroachment.
Again, though, this rationale is hardly convincing. Like the
111. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69; Printz, 521 U.S. at 930.
112. See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849,876-77 (1999).
113. In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), the Court found the required linkage
under the federal spending power of this speed limit to the States' receiving their federal
highway funds.
114. New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991));
Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 (quoting same).
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accountability rationale, the power rationale applies equally to
impermissible commandeering and to permissible encouragement of
state governments through the use of the federal spending power.
Since the anti-commandeering principle limits only the mode of
action Congress chooses to operate upon the States, it is difficult to
see how the principle prevents the balance of power from shifting to
the national government in any realistic sense. If Congress really
wants to regulate an activity, the anti-commandeering principle will
rarely if ever stand in the way."15
Moreover, history teaches that States, and not the federal
government, represent the greater threat to individual liberties in this
country. Centuries of institutional slavery, Jim Crow laws, and the
more recent encroachments on free speech, n6 freedom of religion,"17
and reproductive rights" 8 have proven state governments to be poor
protectors of our individual freedoms."19
3. Money
Finally, under the money rationale, a federal government
unconstrained by anti-commandeering could greatly expand the reach
of its regulatory activity without having to pay for the administrative
oversight that is part and parcel of its regulation. As Justice Scalia
pointed out in Printz, "The power of the Federal Government would
be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its
service-and at no cost to itself-the police officers of the 50
115. On October 9, 1999, President Clinton signed into law a measure conditioning
state governments' receipt of their federal transportation funds upon their agreement not
to release personal information from their Department of Motor Vehicles databases
without the consent of the person whose information is to be released. See Act of Oct. 9,
Pub. L. No. 106-69 § 350. The measure makes special provision for Alabama, Oklahoma,
and Wisconsin, whose Driver's Privacy Protection Act lawsuits were decided by the circuit
courts but are not currently pending before the Supreme Court. See id. One wonders
whether the new law moots the question whether the DPPA is constitutional. As a
practical matter, States will now obey the federal mandate (or, if you wish, the federal
"encouragement") regarding release of motor vehicle records, whether the DPPA stands
or falls.
116. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down state law banning
flag burning); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that state law may not
criminalize the wearing of a jacket bearing the inscription, "Fuck the Draft," merely
because others might find it offensive).
117. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (striking down a Hialeah, Florida, ordinance prohibiting ritual animal sacrifice);
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding
Oregon law prohibiting members of Native American Church from using peyote in
religious ritual).
11& See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (delineating the extent
to which States may impede a woman's ability to obtain an abortion).
119. See Moulton, supra note 112, at 904.
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States." 120 On the other side of the governmental equation, States
required to subsidize the enforcement of federal laws could
eventually lose the ability to allocate their scarce financial resources
to projects of their citizens' own choosing.121
I find the money rationale to be the most persuasive policy
justification for the anti-commandeering principle. Chief Justice
Marshall once observed that "the power to tax involves the power to
destroy."'2 That is because governments, like the people and
businesses they govern, cannot operate without money. Just as a
federal tax directly saps a State of its precious financial resources, so
the need to pay for federal regulation indirectly drains the State's
coffers. While federal taxes and unfunded federal regulatory
programs differ in the degree of their destructive effects (the tax has
the power to destroy far more quickly and directly), there is some
wisdom in remaining vigilant lest federal regulation overrun state
budgets.
The money rationale also differs from both the accountability
rationale and the power rationale in that the money rationale does
not apply equally to a conditional exercise of the federal spending
power. If States find that the money offered by Congress as an
inducement to pass federally favored legislation is inadequate, the
States may simply refuse the federal grant. And while the federal
budget is significantly larger than that of any State, it is not infinite;
Congress cannot endlessly "bribe" the States into enacting all of the
regulatory programs it would like to see.
However, the money rationale also suffers serious analytical
weaknesses. For the last decade, the States have raised strong
political opposition to unfunded federal mandates. Today, the
federal political process incorporates the notion that Congress must
consider the effect on state budgets of any of its programs which the
States will be required to administer.123 Moreover, the money
rationale may or may not be present in any particular case of federal
commandeering. For example, in New York, the federal laws at issue
raised no concerns of federal regulation at state expense. Congress
there simply acted as a broker of the agreements made among the
States themselves and passed the laws at issue to enforce the State-
made compacts.124
120. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997).
121. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
122. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,431 (1819).
123. This is precisely the procedural protection of the States in the national political
process which Garcia envisioned. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528,550-54 (1985).
124. See New York, 505 U.S. at 151-52.
The money rationale cannot alone bear the weight of the anti-
commandeering principle. The Court's asserted policy justifications
for the principle simply do not support reading into the Constitution
such a categorical rule.
C. The Case Against Anti-Commandeering
While the policy justifications offered by the Court fail to
properly support the anti-commandeering principle, these
justifications tell only half the story. As Professor Moulton points
out, federalism seeks a balance of power between the national and
local governments. Maintaining that balance entails not only
protecting the States from abuses of federal power but also
empowering the federal government to act when action is
appropriate. "After all, American federalism was invented as a
means of creating a more effective (and necessarily more powerful)
national government than existed under the Articles of
Confederation."125
The risk that judicially enforced limits on national power will
impede the proper functioning of the nation is more than theoretical.
In the 1930s, the Court's refusal to allow the commerce power to
expand in tandem with the national economy prolonged the Great
Depression and nearly precipitated a constitutional crisis. 126 It seems
unlikely the anti-commandeering principle could cause comparable
disruption. However, since the Court's decisions in New York, Printz,
and Lopez,127 the lower federal courts have been flooded with
litigation attempting to invalidate various congressional enactments
on federalism grounds.128
125. Moulton, supra note 112, at 852.
126. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 183-85 (discussing President
Roosevelt's "Court-packing" plan).
127. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), struck down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, the first U.S. Supreme Court case since 1937 to find a federal law
outside the reach of the commerce power.
128. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 826
(4th Cir. 1999) (finding Congress's creation of private cause of action under the Violence
Against Women Act not within commerce power); United States v. Mack, 164 F.3d 467,
473 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that federal law prohibiting possession of handguns with
obliterated serial numbers does not violate state sovereignty); United States v. Wilson, 159
F.3d 280, 287-88 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding federal prohibition against firearm possession
in interstate commerce while subject to protective order against Tenth Amendment
challenge); Association of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836-
37 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that National Voter Registration Act does not violate Tenth
Amendment); Thompson v. Colorado, 29 F. Supp. 1226, 1238 (D. Colo. 1998) (sustaining
Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act against Tenth Amendment challenge).
Consider also that four district courts and four circuit courts have now been dragged into
the federalism fray solely over the question whether the Driver's Privacy Protection Act is
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Thus, the anti-commandeering principle does not hold the
solution to the federalism problem. Constitutional text, history, and
precedent provide little support for the principle, and its policy
rationales are inadequate to justify its wholesale importation into our
federal constitutional jurisprudence.
D. A Distinction Without a Difference
Even if, however, one accepts the validity of the anti-
commandeering principle, I would still question one aspect of the
Court's jurisprudence under the principle. In New York, the Court
drew a sharp distinction between two types of Tenth Amendment
cases. One type concerned Congress's authority to regulate the
States under generally applicable laws. The other concerned
Congress's authority to encourage or compel the States to regulate
private parties in a particular way. 129 The five-member majority in
Printz reaffirmed the Court's commitment to that distinction.130 The
Court has indicated that it intends to analyze these two classes of
cases under entirely different standards and precedents.131
I fail to see the virtue in the distinction, even if one accepts the
validity of the anti-commandeering principle. If Congress has
regulated the States in a manner which offends the balance of federal-
state power set forth in the Constitution, it is difficult to understand
how the application of those same laws to private parties cures the
constitutional defect. Conversely, if federal regulation of the States
falls within the permissible range, I see no reason to require that the
law also apply to private parties in order that it may withstand
constitutional challenge.132 The Driver's Privacy Protection Act must
be judged on whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional
authority in passing the Act, and not on whether banks, insurance
companies, and other private purveyors of databases must comply
with the same or similar laws.
In Travis,133 Judge Easterbrook attempted to justify the separate
treatment of the two types of federal regulation of the States as an
outgrowth of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine first
constitutional. See supra note 7.
129. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160-61.
130. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932.
131. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160 ("This litigation presents no occasion to apply or
revisit the holdings of any of these cases, as this is not a case in which Congress has
subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties."); Printz, 521 U.S. at
932. See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,758-59 (1982) (recognizing the distinction
without explaining why it is relevant).
132. I am not the first to recognize the analytical weakness of the distinction. See New
York, 505 U.S. at 201-02 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998).
established in Chief Justice Marshall's time. 34 It is now well-
established, for example, that the federal government may not
directly impose a tax upon the States that is greater than the tax it
imposes upon private parties engaging in the same conduct. 35 Judge
Easterbrook suggested that the rationale behind this rule ought also
to restrict the federal government's constitutional authority to
regulate the States. 36  Under this theory, Congress could only
regulate state governments with respect to a particular activity to the
extent it also regulated private parties engaging in the activity.
The extension of the immunity doctrine from taxes to regulation
fails, however, because taxing and regulating are fundamentally
different. The governing body's incentive to tax is always stronger
than its incentive to regulate. Taxes confer benefits on the taxer and
impose burdens upon the one taxed, while regulations impose
burdens upon both the regulator and the one regulated. Specifically,
any tax Congress imposes results in a greater number of dollars in the
federal treasury, while mere congressional regulation costs the federal
government money-in the administration and enforcement of the
new law. Congress might attempt to tax the States merely to raise
revenue, but the federal government would not gratuitously impose
upon itself the administrative costs and burdens of regulating the
States.137
Accordingly, I see no plausible reason for the disparate
treatment the Court accords federal laws directed solely at the States,
as opposed to generally applicable laws which incidentally apply to
the States. The Court should abandon this needless distinction at the
earliest opportunity.
Conclusion
Four States in four different circuits have challenged the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act as an unconstitutional commandeering of the
States' Departments of Motor Vehicles. Two circuits have held that
the Act presents no constitutional problem, while two others have
declared it unconstitutional. 38 Later this term, the Supreme Court
will decide whether the Act stands or falls.
In Part II above, I explained why the Court should uphold the
134. See id. at 1002-03.
135. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515-27 (1988).
136. See Travis, 163 F.3d at 1002 (emphasis added).
137. In addition, a tax generally imposes a greater burden upon its object than does a
regulation. For example, States will bear only slight financial burdens in amending the
administrative procedures followed by their Departments of Motor Vehicles in order to
comply with the DPPA.
138. See supra note 15.
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Act. Unlike the regulation of low-level radioactive waste at issue in
New York v. United States139 or the interim handgun provision at
issue in Printz v. United States"4° , the Act does not use the States as
implementing agents of a federal regulatory program. Instead, the
Act directly regulates the States, requiring certain actions and
forbidding others. Accordingly, the Act does not unconstitutionally
commandeer the state governments; like any valid federal law, it
simply demands compliance.
In Part III, I explored the underpinnings of the anti-
commandeering principle, which has animated the last decade of the
Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. I found no satisfying
justification for the principle. The principle lacks substantial support
in constitutional text, history, or pre-New York precedent. Moreover,
the policy justifications the Court has articulated in defense of anti-
commandeering are susceptible to powerful counterarguments.
Given this state of affairs, it is startling that the Court has adopted
anti-commandeering as an absolute constitutional prohibition.
Rebecca Schaeffer's murder was a tragic event, made possible by
easy access to the personal information contained in her DMV
records. And while state governments were slow to restrict that
access, Congress passed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act. It seems
that federalism-the idea that two separate governments should
exercise concurrent regulatory authority over us-has one additional
benefit. When we need a law passed, we have two places to which we
can turn.
139. 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
140. 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
I
